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Data from medical research are typically summarized with various types of outcome
measures. We present three arguments in favor of absolute over relative outcome mea-
sures. The first argument is from cognitive bias: relative measures promote the reference
class fallacy and the overestimation of treatment effectiveness. The second argument is
decision-theoretic: absolute measures are superior to relative measures for making a de-
cision between interventions. The third argument is causal: interpreted as measures of
causal strength, absolute measures satisfy a set of desirable properties, but relative mea-
sures do not. Absolute outcome measures outperform relative measures on all counts.1. Introduction. Clinical trials are performed in order to assess whether an
experimental intervention is effective and, if so, to what degree. To make
these inferences, data from clinical trials must be quantitatively summarized
and analyzed in particular ways. Similar questions arise in epidemiology for
assessing the degree to which exposure to a risk changes the probability of
developing a disease.
Several classes of such quantitative methods of analysis are available to
medical researchers, including ‘relative’ outcome measures and ‘absolute’
outcome measures (we precisely define prominent examples of these mea-
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ARGUMENTS FOR ABSOLUTE OUTCOME MEASURES 841class of outcome measures. Here we offer three distinct arguments that ab-
solute outcome measures are superior to relative outcome measures.
Relative measures are widely used in clinical science—our three argu-
ments entail that this widespread practice is epistemologically corrupt. The
first argument for the superiority of absolute measures is from cognitive bias:
the use of relative measures promotes a reasoning fallacy and often leads to
overestimation of intervention effectiveness, but absolute measures do not
have this property (sec. 3; see also Stegenga 2015). Relative measures are
erroneously taken to indicate risk reduction in the population as a whole.
We prove, in section 4, that absolute outcome measures are sufficient (given
the costs and utilities associated with the interventions) for making a rational
choice between interventions. By contrast, relative outcome measures are
neither necessary nor sufficient for choosing between two interventions.
Thus, from a decision-theoretic perspective, the widespread use of relative
outcome measures is misguided. In section 5 we present our third argument,
the causal strength argument, in which we develop principled desiderata for
probabilistic measures of causal strength and argue that absolute measures
are superior to relative measures with respect to these desiderata. All three
arguments employ particular absolute outcome measures (absolute risk re-
duction and number needed to treat) and relative outcome measures (relative
risk and relative risk reduction) as exemplars. We conclude that medical sci-
ence should more consistently use and report absolute outcome measures.
2. Outcome Measures in Medical Research. Clinical trials often mea-
sure outcomes in binary terms, such as the (non)occurrence of a heart attack
in a certain time period. Many prominent outcome measures apply to binary
events: the odds ratio, relative risk (or risk ratio), relative risk reduction, ab-
solute risk reduction (or risk difference), and number needed to treat. These
measures can be defined by constructing a two-by-two table: suppose a trial
has one group (E) composed of subjects who receive the experimental in-
tervention and a control group (C) composed of subjects who receive a dif-
ferent intervention (e.g., another intervention, a placebo, or no treatment at
all). Suppose further that the binary outcome is measured as present (Y) or
absent (~Y) and the number of subjects with each outcome in each group is
represented by letters (a–d), as shown in table 1.TABLE 1. FREQUENCY TABLE FOR A CLINICAL TRIAL WITH BINARY OUTCOMES
Group/Outcome
Outcome Present
(Y)
Outcome Absent
(~Y)
Total Number in
Group
Experimental intervention (E) a b a 1 b
Control (C) c d c 1 dThis content dow
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All uThen the most prominent outcome measures can be defined as follows.1. An
same
altern
and i
‘risk
2. Th
freely
iting
does
se subRelative risk: RR 5 ½a=(a 1 b)=½c=(c 1 d).
Relative risk reduction: RRR 5 f½a=(a 1 b) 2 ½c=(c 1 d)g=½c=(c 1 d).
Absolute risk reduction: ARR 5 a=(a 1 b) 2 c=(c 1 d).
Number needed to treat: NNT 5 1=f½a=(a 1 b) 2 ½c=(c 1 d)g.Observe that all these measures are defined in terms of the observed relative
frequencies a=(a 1 b) and c=(c 1 d).1 It is convenient to write the outcome
measures as a function of conditional probabilities that represent these fre-
quencies. The probability of a subject having a Y outcome given that the
subject is in group E, P(YjE), is a=(a 1 b), and likewise, the probability
of having a Y outcome given that the subject is in group C, P(YjC), is
c=(c 1 d).2 Thus, we can define relative risk, relative risk reduction, abso-
lute risk reduction, and number needed to treat as
RR 5 P YjEð Þ=P YjCð Þ:
RRR 5 P YjEð Þ 2 P YjCð Þ½ =P YjCð Þ 5 RR 2 1:
ARR 5 P YjEð Þ 2 P YjCð Þ:
NNT 5 1= P YjEð Þ 2 P YjCð Þ½  5 1=ARR:
Thus, RR and RRR are interchangeable and just differ in their scaling prop-
erties. Same with ARR and NNT. An intuitive interpretation of RR is the
ratio of the frequency of recovery (or risk) in the treatment and the control
group. RRR, by contrast, can be interpreted as a measure of causal attribu-
tion. For instance, let P(YjC) (the probability of dying without taking a par-
ticular drug) be 4%, and let P(YjE) (the probability of dying after taking the
drug) be 1%. Then RRR is equal to 75%: this is the proportion of deaths in
the control group that vanish in the treatment group. For this reason, RRR isother prominent outcome measure is the odds ratio OR 5 (a=b)=(c=d). This is the
as the ratio of the relative risk (RR) for Y and for ~Y. OR is often proposed as an
ative to RR and RRR (e.g., Nurminen 1995), especially for case-control studies,
t belongs to the class of relative measures. Also note that ARR is sometimes called
difference’.
ese probabilities are calculated from observed actual frequencies, and we switch
between both notations. However, they can also be interpreted as estimates of lim-
relative frequencies, causal propensities, or subjective degrees of belief. Our article
not take a stand on this question.
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ARGUMENTS FOR ABSOLUTE OUTCOME MEASURES 843a particularly popular outcome measure in clinical science and epidemiol-
ogy (e.g., Walter 1976; Northridge 1995).
The probabilistic notation of outcome measures abstracts away from the
sample size of a clinical trial. Here is an example. A large randomized con-
trolled trial called the Heart Protection Study was performed to test the ca-
pacity of a cholesterol-lowering drug to mitigate heart attacks and death
among men with heart disease (HPSCG 2002). Over 20,000 middle-age
and elderly men who had heart disease or were at high risk for heart disease
were recruited to the study, and half were randomly allocated to receive sim-
vastatin (the cholesterol-lowering drug) and half to receive a placebo, for
5 years. After these 5 years, death from all causes was 12.9% in the sim-
vastatin group and 14.7% in the placebo group, for an ARR of 1.8% and
an RRR of 12.2%.3 Notably, although the event rates for the study groups
were reported in the abstract, the only outcome measures reported were rel-
ative measures.
This neglect of absolute outcome measures is a common practice in clin-
ical research.A survey byKing,Harper, andYoung (2012) took a large a sam-
ple of articles published inmedical and epidemiology journals and found that
75% reported only relative measures. This is encouraged by numerous proc-
lamations to prefer relative outcome measures over alternatives, such as ed-
itorials in influential journals such as the British Medical Journal: “Authors
and journal editors should ensure that the results of trials and systematic re-
views are reported as relative risks unless there is a convincing argument oth-
erwise” (Deeks 1998, 1155). In what follows we challenge this practice by
providing three different arguments for the superiority of absolute measures
over relative measures.
3. The Argument fromCognitive Bias. The framing of a medical risk of-
ten affects the conclusions that are drawn. Physicians and patients overes-
timate the effectiveness of medical interventions when presented with only
relative measures (see also Stegenga 2015). This systematic overestimation
occurs because the employment of relative measures, such as RR or RRR,
promotes the reference class fallacy, which we will explain below.
For starters, relative and absolute outcome measures can appear very dif-
ferent when the control event rate (i.e., P(YjC)) is low. Consider the example
of the Helsinki Heart Study, which tested the capacity of a drug (gemfibrozil)
to decrease cardiac disease and death (Frick et al. 1987). After 5 years of tak-3. Strictly speaking, both ARR and RRR deliver negative values, but we follow the con-
vention in much of the medical literature to only report absolute values and to suppress
the sign.
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All uing the drug, the subjects in the experimental group had a reduced relative
risk of cardiac disease of 34% (RRR). Because of the low base probability of
cardiac disease, this amounted to an absolute risk reduction of 1.4% (ARR).
These are different orders of magnitude.
It is a robust empirical finding that physicians are more likely to prescribe
a drug when the risk is expressed in relative than in absolute terms (Forrow,
Taylor, and Arnold 1992; Bobbio, Demichelis, and Giustetto 1994; Nexøe
et al. 2002). In the experiment by Bobbio et al., which drew on data from
the Helsinki Heart Study, physicians had to choose between various drugs
on the basis of reported outcome measures. The effect of drug Awas quan-
tified with a relative outcome measure (RRR 5 34%), and the effect of
drug B was quantified with an absolute outcome measure (ARR 5 1:4%).
Physicians were muchmore likely to prescribe drug A than drug B, although
both outcome measures were quantifications of the same data about the
same drug. Patients show a similar pattern when asked for their acceptance
of amedical treatment (Malenka et al. 1993; Hux andNaylor 1995; Sorensen
et al. 2008).
This behavior represents a substantive overestimation of treatment ef-
fects. In many cases of common preventive care (e.g., lowering blood pres-
sure or cholesterol levels), the rates of the risk (e.g., a cardiac event) are low
in both the treatment and the control group. The above levels of RRR and
ARRs correspond to a control event rate of P(YjC) 5 4:1% and a treatment
event rate of P(YjE) 5 2:7%. The relative outcome measure RRR 5 34%
suggests a strong effect when actually the treatment only helps a small num-
ber of patients exposed to the risk (1.4% of patients, to be precise).
Overestimation of intervention effectiveness is due to the reference class
fallacy. That is, the sentence “a 34% cardiac event reduction was demon-
strated” is taken to imply that 34% of all patients benefit from the treatment
when in reality this number only refers to a small subset of that population:
the patients in the control group that develop Y. The reference class fallacy
explains why framing risk in relative terms leads to more optimistic esti-
mates of effectiveness.
However, do physicians and patients really commit a fallacy? In the above
study by Bobbio et al., the control event rate P(YjC) was not revealed to the
participants. But without such information, one cannot meaningfully com-
pare the values of ARR and RRR and realize that they have been computed
from the same data set. Therefore, one cannot infer that participants in the
above study are committing a proper reasoning fallacy.
This objection is sound, but unfortunately experiments reveal that cog-
nitive bias persists in the face of full information. Malenka et al. (1993) ob-
served that patients are, for the most part, unable to translate relative out-
come measures into absolute outcome measures, even if the control eventThis content downloaded from 087.079.184.140 on May 04, 2020 05:59:42 AM
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ARGUMENTS FOR ABSOLUTE OUTCOME MEASURES 845rate is known. In their experiment, participants were presented with a con-
trol event rate P(YjC) 5 50% (the risk of dying in the next year without
treatment) and a medication that would decrease this risk by 50%. Only
28.2% of the participants of the study drew the correct conclusion that this
medication would prevent 25 deaths if 100 people were treated; 47.7% of
participants claimed that 50 deaths would be prevented. Most other partic-
ipants said they did not know the answer.
This experiment reveals that we are dealing with a proper reasoning fal-
lacy and that this fallacy is due to a misidentification of the relevant refer-
ence class. Hence, inferring effectiveness of a medical treatment on the ba-
sis of relative outcome measures is indeed prone to cognitive bias. Since
relative outcome measures trigger cognitive biases in both physicians and
patients, such measures should be avoided. We will now argue that absolute
outcome measures are excellent alternatives.
4. The Decision-Theoretic Argument. Some commentators have sug-
gested that the absolute risk reduction measure is superior to relative mea-
sures in a decision context. This view is occasionally expressed in the clin-
ical literature and sometimes by philosophers, such as Worrall (2010) and
Stegenga (2015). Here we prove that this is indeed the case.
Let A mean that a patient consumes treatment A; let B mean that the pa-
tient consumes treatment B (this could be a competitor intervention, placebo,
or nothing at all); let a be the cost of consuming A (where cost is construed
broadly, to include all harmful effects of A); let b be the cost of consuming B
(again construed broadly). Let Y mean that the outcome of interest occurs
(e.g., recovery); finally, let the utility of Y be u and the utility of ~Y be u0.4
The expected utility of consumingA is EU[A], and the expected utility of con-
suming B is EU[B].
The principle of maximizing expected utility holds that a patient should
consume A rather than B if and only if (iff ) the expected utility of consuming
A is greater than that of consuming B. The corresponding decision rule is4. Th
those
All (#) For any u, u0, a, and b (without loss of generality: a > b and u > u0),
consume A rather than B if and only if EU½A > EU½B.An outcome measure is EU-sufficient if and only if the outcome measure is
sufficient to compare EU[A] and EU[B], for given a, b, u, and u0. An out-
come measure is EU-insufficient if and only if it is not EU-sufficient (i.e., if
and only if the outcomemeasure is insufficient to compare EU[A] and EU[B],ese a’s and b’s, which denote the costs of a treatment, should not be conflated with
from the introduction.
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All ufor given a, b, u, and u0). If an outcome measure is EU-sufficient then there
is a strong pro tanto reason for requiring its use in measuring the effective-
ness of medical interventions, and conversely, if an outcome measure is EU-
insufficient then there is a strong pro tanto reason against its use in measuring
the effectiveness ofmedical interventions.We now prove that ARR andNNT
are EU-sufficient and RR and RRR are EU-insufficient.5
4.1. ARR and NNT Are EU-Sufficient. With the above approach, we
can calculate the expected utility of treatment A and B as
EU A½  5 P YjAð Þu 1 P ∼ YjAð Þu0 2 a
5 P YjAð Þu 1 1 2 P YjAð Þ½ u0 2 a
5 P YjAð Þ u 2 u0  1 u0 2 a:
EU B½  5 P YjBð Þu 1 1 2 P YjBð Þ½ u0 2 b
5 P YjBð Þ u 2 u0  1 u0 2 b:
The expected utility of consuming A rather than consuming B is
EU A½  2 EU B½  5 P YjAð Þ u 2 u0  1 u0 2 a 2 P YjBð Þ u 2 u0  1 u0 2 b 
5 P YjAð Þ 2 P YjBð Þ½  u 2 u0  2 a 2 bð Þ:
Note that ARR appears as the leftmost multiplicand in this term.
Thus,
EU A½  2 EU B½  > 0 iff P YjAð Þ 2 P YjBð Þ½  u 2 u0  2 a 2 bð Þ > 0,
which, assuming u ≠ u0, is equivalent to
EU A½  > EU B½  iff P YjAð Þ 2 P YjBð Þ½  > a 2 b
u 2 u0
:
Note that ARR appears on the left side of this inequality, and the right side
of the inequality is fully determined by a, b, u, and u0. So, given a, b, u, u0,
and ARR, one can determine whether EU½A > EU½B. Thus, ARR is EU-
sufficient, and one should consumeA if and only if ARR > (a 2 b)=(u 2 u0).
The same result holds for NNT, which is just the inverse of ARR:
EU A½  > EU B½  iff 1
NNT
>
a 2 b
u 2 u0
:5. In our derivation, we estimate the conditional probabilities by the observed relative
frequencies (see table 1). This is a significant idealization, but it does not affect the ar-
gument that follows. For discussion, see Stegenga (2015).
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ARGUMENTS FOR ABSOLUTE OUTCOME MEASURES 8474.2. RR and RRR Are EU-Insufficient. Assume without loss of gener-
ality that RR > 1. Above we showed that
EU A½  > EU B½  iff P YjAð Þ 2 P YjBð Þ½  > a 2 b
u 2 u0
:
Note that
P YjAð Þ 2 P YjBð Þ 5 P YjBð Þ P YjAð Þ
P YjBð Þ 2 1
 
,
which is equivalent to
P YjAð Þ 2 P YjBð Þ 5 P YjBð Þ RR 2 1ð Þ,
and so
EU A½  > EU B½  iff P YjBð Þ RR 2 1ð Þ > a 2 b
u 2 u0
,
which is, given RR > 1, equivalent to
EU A½  > EU B½  iff P YjBð Þ > a 2 b
u 2 u0
 
RR 2 1ð Þ : (1)
Thus, # holds that one should consume A rather than B if and only if
P(YjB) > (a 2 b)=(u 2 u0)(RR 2 1). Note that a given RR does not con-
strain the values that P(YjB) can take in the interval [0,1], nor do the values
of a, b, u, or u0. So, for any particular value of RR we consider two cases:
i) P(YjB) 5 (a 2 b)=½(u 2 u0)(RR 2 1) 2 ε
ii) P(YjB) 5 (a 2 b)=½(u 2 u0)(RR 2 1) 1 ε
for some ε that is suitably small such that P(YjB) remains bounded between
0 and 1. Now consider both cases separately:All Case i: P(YjB) < (a 2 b)=½(u 2 u0)(RR 2 1), and thus EU½A < EU½B.
Case ii: P(YjB) > (a 2 b)=½(u 2 u0)(RR 2 1), and thus EU½A > EU½B.So, if given a, b, u, u0, andRR, one cannot determinewhether EU½A > EU½B.
Thus, RR is EU-insufficient, which means that decisions based on RR may
not have maximal expected utility, depending on the values of P(YjB). The
same result can be shown for RRR 5 RR 2 1. We simply rewrite (1) as
EU A½  > EU B½  iff P YjBð Þ > a 2 b
u 2 u0
   RRR :This content downloaded from 087.079.184.140 on May 04, 2020 05:59:42 AM
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All uAgain, for any particular RRR, we can consider two cases:
i) P(YjB) 5 ½(a 2 b)=½(u 2 u0)  RRR 2 ε
ii) P(YjB) 5 ½(a 2 b)=½(u 2 u0)  RRR 1 ε
for some ε that is suitably small such that P(YjB) remains bounded between
0 and 1. Now consider both cases separately:
848 JAN SPRENGER AND JACOB STEGENGA6. EU
odds
se subCase i: P(YjB) < (a 2 b)=½(u 2 u0)  RRR, and thus EU½A < EU½B.
Case ii: P(YjB) > (a 2 b)=½(u 2 u0)  RRR, and thus EU½A > EU½B.Thus, RRR cannot determine alone, given a, b, u, and u0, whetherAhas a higher
expected utility than B. This concludes the proof of the EU-insufficiency of RR
and RRR.6 But, decisions based on ARR and NNTwill always pick the inter-
vention with the higher expected utility.
Hence, relative outcome measures may be useful for attributing outcomes
to causal factors, but they are not suitable for making choices that are sup-
posed to maximize the expected utility of a future patient. This demonstrates
once more the special status of absolute outcome measures such as ARR and
NNT. In practice, a, b, u, and u0 may be unknown or a matter of contention,
but it is important that we are in principle able to base a rational decision on
the value of an outcome measure.
5. The Causal Strength Argument. The various outcome measures can
also be regarded as a quantification of statistical effect size or as measures
of the causal strength of the link between a treatment and an effect. Indeed,
the literature on probabilistic causation often quantifies the strength of a causal
link by comparing two conditional probabilities: the probability of an effect
given the putative cause, P(YjE), and the probability of the same effect given
the absence of the cause, P(YjC) (Suppes 1970; Cartwright 1979; Eells 1991;
Fitelson and Hitchcock 2011). We can interpret outcome measures in med-
icine as measures of the causal strength between treatment and recovery. Af-
ter all, medical trials try to answer questions about the causal effectiveness
of interventions.
Our argument in this section draws on two observations: (1) ARR, NNT,
and derived absolute outcome measures combine assessments of causal
strength in an intuitive way, and (2) RR, RRR, and derived relative mea-
sures misrepresent the causal strength of an intervention for a conjunction
of unrelated effects. For a detailed axiomatic investigation of probabilistic
causal strength measures for binary outcomes, see Sprenger (forthcoming).-insufficiency can also be demonstrated for another relative outcome measure, the
ratio OR (proof omitted; see n. 1 for a definition).
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ARGUMENTS FOR ABSOLUTE OUTCOME MEASURES 849The first observation deals with combining assessments of causal strength
along a single path. In causal inference, we often have to deal withmediators:
variables that transfer an effect from an intervention to an observed effect. For
instance, frequent exercise (E) has an effect on the occurrence of cardiovas-
cular diseases (D) via various intermediate properties such as one’s blood
pressure (B). (Assume for the sake of simplicity that this is the only link be-
tween exercise and cardiovascular diseases; see fig. 1.) Now, it is often desir-
able to combine assessments of causal strength along a causal graph such as
the one in figure 1 in a natural manner. That is, the strength of the two causal
links between exercise and blood pressure, and between blood pressure and
cardiovascular diseases, should be sufficient to determine the overall causal
strength of the relationship between exercise and cardiovascular diseases. In
other words, there is a function f such that for any measure c of causal
strength c(E, D) 5 f (c(E, B), c(B, D)). One may also demand that c(E, D) ≤
c(E, B) and c(E, D) ≤ c(B, D): the presence of intermediate variables does
not increase causal strength. A natural function that satisfies this requirement
and several other ones on combining causal strength is ARR(E, D) 5 P(DjE) 2
P(Dj ∼ E) (see also Good 1961). In fact, ARR(E, D) 5 ARR(E, B) 
ARR(B, D), which allows for a particularly simple calculation of overall
causal strength as a function of the strength of individual links. Similarly,
NNT(E, D) 5 NNT(E, B)  NNT(B, D).All Proof for ARR
ARR E, Dð Þ 5 P DjEð Þ 2 P Dj ∼ Eð Þ
5 P DjBEð ÞP BjEð Þ 1 P Dj ∼ BEð ÞP ∼ BjEð Þ 2 P DjB ∼ Eð ÞP Bj ∼ Eð Þ
2 P Dj ∼ B ∼ Eð ÞP ∼ Bj ∼ Eð Þ by the law of total probability½ 
5 P DjBð ÞP BjEð Þ 1 P Dj ∼ Bð ÞP ∼ BjEð Þ 2 P DjBð ÞP Bj ∼ Eð Þ
2 P Dj ∼ Bð ÞP ∼ Bj ∼ Eð Þ by the causal structure of the graph½ 
5 P DjBð Þ P BjEð Þ 2 P Bj ∼ Eð Þ½  1 P Dj ∼ Bð Þ½P ∼ BjEð Þ 2 P ∼ Bj ∼ Eð Þ
5 P DjBð Þ P BjEð Þ 2 P Bj ∼ Eð Þ½  2 P Dj ∼ Bð Þ P BjEð Þ 2 P Bj ∼ Eð Þ½ 
5 P DjBð Þ 2 P Dj ∼ Bð Þ½   P BjEð Þ 2 P Bj ∼ Eð Þ½ 
5 ARR B, Dð Þ  ARR E, Bð Þ:Figure 1. Causal relationship between three variables represented as a directed
acyclical graph.This content downloaded from 087.079.184.140 on May 04, 2020 05:59:42 AM
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All use subThe analogous result for NNT follows easily from the equality NNT 5
1=ARR: NNT(E, D) 5 1=ARR(E, D) 5 1=(ARR(B, D) ARR(E, B))5
NNT(B, D)  NNT(E, D): QEDOther measures, such as RR and RRR, do not have this property: for these
measures, the overall causal strength is not a function of the measures of the
individual causal links. One can demonstrate that derivatives of ARR are
the only measures of causal strength that satisfy this property together with
the relatively uncontroversial constraint that causal strength is a function on
P(YjE) and P(YjC), where E and C denote an experimental intervention and
a control intervention, respectively (Sprenger, forthcoming, theorem 2).
The second observation deals with composite effects. Imagine that an in-
tervention E (e.g., blood pressure lowering medication) has a certain effect
on the occurrence of a binary event Y (e.g., a heart attack). Now suppose
that we want to quantify the effect of E on the conjunction of Yand an event
Z that is independent of both E and Y (e.g., frequent migraine attacks). Al-
though E does nothing to reduce the risk of Z, the causal effect of E on Y&Z
is as great as the causal effect of E for Y, according to RR and RRR. It can
be shown that RR, RRR, and their derivatives are the only outcome mea-
sures that have this property (Sprenger, forthcoming, theorem 3).Proof for RR. Suppose that Z is an effect that is independent of the inter-
vention E. Suppose also that Yand Z are independent conditional on E. Then
P(YZjE) 5 P(YjE)  p(ZjE) 5 P(YjE)  p(Z). The same holds for C 5
∼ E: P(YZjC)5 P(YjC) P(ZjC)5 P(YjC) p(Z). Hence, RR(E, YZ)5
P(YjE)=P(YjC) 5 RR(E, Y). SinceRRR 5 RR 2 1, the same results hold
for RRR, too. QEDThis property is likely to mislead physicians and patients because a nonex-
istent causal relationship is suggested. It also opens the door to the manip-
ulation of the presentation of trial outcomes. Therefore, ARR and NNT
should be preferred to RR, RRR, and other relative outcome measures.
6. Conclusion. We have argued for the superiority of absolute over rela-
tive outcome measures. Unfortunately, relative measures are widely em-
ployed in clinical research, and absolute measures are underused. Our argu-
ments show this to be a mistake and call for a change of this practice. Some
clinical scientists, statisticians, and philosophers have claimed that absolute
measures are superior to relative measures, and in this article we provide a
principled justification for this view.
We have made a cumulative case for this conclusion. The argument from
cognitive bias contends that using the absolute risk reduction ARR instead
of the relative risk reduction RRR or other relative outcome measures de-This content downloaded from 087.079.184.140 on May 04, 2020 05:59:42 AM
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ARGUMENTS FOR ABSOLUTE OUTCOME MEASURES 851creases the chance of overestimating treatment effects and committing the
reference class fallacy. The decision-theoretic argument demonstrates that
absolute measures are necessary and sufficient (when given pertinent costs
and utilities) to choose between intervention options according to dictates of
decision theory, while relative measures are insufficient in this regard. Fi-
nally, the causal strength argument shows that ARR possesses a natural in-
terpretation as a measure of causal strength between an intervention and an
observed result and that it has several properties that distinguish it as such a
measure. By contrast, relative outcome measures fail to combine causal
strength assessments satisfactorily, and they fail to detect when interventions
only affect one instead of several outcomes of interest.
While each single argument may be sufficient to establish the superiority
of ARR and its derivatives over relative measures, we consider the cumu-
lative case to be particularly compelling. Medical science, whether in clin-
ical trials or in epidemiology, should always use and report absolute out-
come measures.REFERENCES
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